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Abstract
In this note we consider the preferences of a profit maximizing firm for
international ownership in a world in which firms compete in an international
Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We find that
firms prefer national ownership and show that full indigenisation occurs in the
equilibrium.
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Evolution (ELSE).1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this note we consider the preferences of a pro￿t maximizing ￿rm for in-
ternational ownership in a world in which ￿rms compete in an international
Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We ￿nd
that ￿rms prefer national ownership and show that full indigenisation occurs
in equilibrium.
It has been noted earlier that internationally dispersed ￿rm ownership
matters for countries￿ incentives vis-a-vis ￿r m si nt h e i ro w nc o u n t r y . B a r -
ros and Cabral (1994) study merger in an international framework showing
that foreign ownership should change a regulator￿s decisions if the regulator
cares about national welfare.1 In the context of strategic trade policy, Dick
(1993) and Welzel (1995) study two-￿rm-two-country models and show that
countries￿ incentives to subsidize home ￿rms may decrease in the presence of
international ownership. Dick supports this theoretical result also by data
from US industries.2
We endogenize the ownership structure of ￿rms if this structure is cho-
sen with the aim of maximizing the ￿rm￿s pro￿t and allow for the general
case of n ￿rms in n countries. Firms maximize pro￿ts and choose the in-
ternational composition of their shareholders. Our main result is that fully
national ownership is an equilibrium phenomenon. This ￿nding may con-
1Similarly, Konrad and Lommerud (2001) show that a foreign investor may protect
a larger share of the returns of foreign direct investment from con￿scation by an in-
digenisation strategy. Indigenisation changes the host country￿s weights regarding the
redistribution bene￿ts and the production eﬃciency cost of extortionary taxation.
2Further related work includes Feeney and Hillman (2001) who study how strategic
trade policy can change as a result of privatization of ￿rms when equity is internationally
tradeable.
1tribute to explaining the puzzle of strong and robust home country biases as
documented, for example, in Adler and Dumas (1983), French and Poterba
(1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995).
Our result does not follow trivially since an increase in the share of in-
ternational owners has countervailing eﬀects. It is not clear which eﬀect
dominates. Let us assume that all ￿rms are fully nationally owned and that
one ￿rm, say ￿rm A in country A deviates from that by raising some capital
in country B. This will have the following eﬀects.
￿ The incentives for country B to subsidize their own ￿rms are reduced
due to cannibalization. C.p., this is of bene￿tf o r￿rm A.
￿ The incentives for country A to subsidize ￿rm A are reduced because
some of ￿rm A￿s pro￿ts now ￿ow into country B. C.p., this harms
￿rm A.
We are not able to determine which eﬀects are dominating in general, but
we show that starting from full indigenization, the negative eﬀect of going
international overpowers the advantage that is caused by the ￿rst eﬀect.
Hence, full national ownership is an equilibrium phenomenen. This, however,
does not rule out that there are (potentially fully mixed) equilibria where
￿rms become multinationals.
The assumption that ￿rms can in￿uence the international composition of
their shareholders may need some justi￿cation. For private ￿r m st h i si sa
natural assumption. Here existing (domestic) owners as well as the manage-
ment do have control over the choice of new investors. Moreover, as it will
turn out that foreign ownership reduces equilibrium pro￿ts, new investors￿
willingness to pay for a share of the company falls short of the value this
share has if the ￿rm continues to be owned by domestic investors. For public
2￿rms the assumption is harder to justify. Particularly, portfolio investors
from abroad cannot be assumed to internalize the reduction of the ￿rm￿s
pro￿ts that results from international ownership, if their investment share is
small. However, if the ￿rm is controlled by a group of large shareholders,
given the results developed here, these may have a common interest that none
of them sells a block of shares to a foreign investor. More precisely, domestic
shareholders and investors should be willing to pay a premium above the
willingness-to-pay of a foreign investor because foreign ownership will reduce
the market value of the ￿rm. Also, it seems reasonable to assume that man-
agement have some sort of control when new capital is raised, for example,
by the type of investor relations policy chosen, or the choice of accounting
standards (national norms or US norms), and related to this, by the choice
of the stock exchange at which the ￿rm is listed.
Finally, in some cases our results might also give reason for public ￿rms
to go private again, a move that has gained some popularity in Europe.3
2 International ownership and strategic trade
We consider a symmetric situation using the standard strategic trade policy
framework by Brander and Spencer (1985) but with n ￿rms in n countries,
￿rm i being located in country i. Up to the point where we depart, the frame-
work is well known and can be reviewed brie￿y. Firms produce quantities xi
of a homogenous good which is exported to some other country that behaves
passively with respect to its imports. For ease of notation, we assume linear
demand and cost, the benchmark case for most oligopoly models. Without
loss of generality we normalize marginal costs to zero and inverse demand to
3See, for example, Time Magazine from October 23, 2000 (Vol. 156).
3p(X)=1− X with X =
P
i xi. Accordingly, ￿rm i￿s pro￿ti s
π
i = x
i(1 − X + si) (1)
where si is the subsidy paid to ￿rm i a n dc h o s e nb yg o v e r n m e n ti in order
to maximize national welfare. The countries ￿rst choose their subsidies si-
multaneously, and once these are given and observed by everyone, the ￿rms















Anticipating (2), countries choose subsidies. Country j￿s welfare is given
by a weighted sum of the pro￿ts of those ￿rms that are at least partly owned





















j is the share of ￿rm i owned by citizens of country j.D i ﬀerentiating






















For the case of pure national ownership everywhere, i.e. if all α
j
j =1 ,
we get e sj = n−1
1+n2, the generalized version of the well-known Brander and
Spencer result. In that case, ￿rm i￿s pro￿ts are given by e πi = n2
(1+n2)
2.
The question arises whether national ownership is an equilibrium in a
larger game where ￿rms can ￿rst choose the international composition of
4equity holders before governments choose their subsidies, i.e., where a ￿rm￿s





j =1 . To answer this
question we ￿rst analyse the subsidy-setting subgame that countries play
when all ￿rms but one are fully indigenised, i.e., when αh
h =1for all h


























while the ￿rst-order condition for country i which hosts and subsidizes the





























Solving the simultaneous equations (see the appendix) shows that the equi-
librium subsidies depend only the total amount of capital ￿rm i seeks abroad.
So, let ε =
P
h6=i αi




n − 1 − 2εn





2εn2 + n − 4εn − 1 − 2ε
2εn3 − 2εn2 + n2 +1
.( 9 )











(2εn3 − 2εn2 + n2 +1 )
3 < 0.
Hence, it does not pay for ￿rm i t od e v i a t ef r o mp u r en a t i o n a lo w n e r s h i p .
5Proposition 1 Pure national ownership (full indigenisation) is an equilib-
rium.
3 Discussion
In this paper we analyzed the relationship between international ownership
and equilibrium pro￿ts for ￿rms which compete in an international oligopoly
in which countries use strategic trade policy. We show for the linear bench-
mark case that ￿rms maximize their pro￿ts if they preserve national owner-
ship.
Intuitively, internationally dispersed ownership reduces the subsidy a ￿rm
r e c e i v e sf r o mi t sh o m ec o u n t r y .T h i sl o w e r st h e￿rm￿s pro￿ts. However, this
eﬀect is counteracted as international diversi￿cation of equity also reduces
the other countries￿ subsidies to their own ￿rms. We show that the direct
eﬀects of reduced subsidies in the home country dominates the bene￿cial
eﬀects of reduced subsidies to the ￿rms in all other countries. Hence, fully
domestic ownership of all ￿rms occurs in the equilibrium.
The analysis highlights a strategic reason why ￿rms prefer national own-
ership. Several simplifying restrictions have been made to make the analysis
tractable, e.g., linear demand, constant marginal cost, complete and perfect
information etc. Deviations from these assumptions may in some cases gen-
erate eﬀects that add or substract to the bene￿to fn a t i o n a lo w n e r s h i pb u t
will typically not make the eﬀect disappear. Two of these assumptions are
particularly worthwhile to be discussed brie￿y.
One potentially restrictive assumption in our analysis is the symmetry of
￿rms. This assumption reduces the analysis of n players essentially to the
two-players case, as each player cares only about the aggregate behavior of
6all other players. To check robustness, we therefore analysed the case of two
countries with two ￿rms and cost asymmetries, where cost asymmetries map
￿rm size in a Cournot framework. Let the two ￿rms diﬀer in their constant
marginal cost. Let ￿rm 2 be the big ￿rm, that is, c1 ≥ c2.F u r t h e r ,l e tc2 =0
by appropriate normalization. Straightforward but somewhat tedious calcu-
lations show that full indigenisation of ￿rms is still an equilibrium provided
that c1 ∈ [0,1/3]. This shows that even major cost diﬀerences do not change
the main result in this paper. Note also that a cost diﬀerence that is even
bigger typically leads to corner solutions. For instance, if c1 > 1/3 and both
￿rms are indigenised, the small ￿rm 1 produces zero output and makes zero
pro￿t in the continuation game with strategic trade policies.
Another assumption that deserves some discussion is that of Cournot
competition for which the ￿rms￿ choice variables are strategic substitutes.
As is known from Eaton and Grossman (1986), Bertrand competition, where
actions are strategic complements, can lead to strategic trade taxes. Firms
may then want to reduce their governments￿ incentives to use such taxes
against them, and international portfolio diversi￿cation could be a means for
achieving this goal. The crucial question therefore is whether ￿rms￿ choice
variables are indeed strategic substitutes as assumed here. As has been
argued by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), this can be the case even if ￿rms
compete in prices at some later stage of the game, if they ￿rst make capacity
choices. Similarly, strategic substitutability can be caused if ￿rms compete in
R&D contests prior to a price or quantity game. A more general set-up that
also lends some support to the case of strategic substitutability and strategic
trade subsidies for a wide parameter range is provided by Maggi (1996).
As mentioned in the introduction our results may contribute to explaining
7the well-documentated home-country bias for public ￿rms4 and, as private
￿rms might have better control over the international composition of equity
why public ￿rms decide to go private again. A few hypotheses that could be
tested are as follows:
￿ As private ￿rms and public ￿rms with large shareholders can more
easily control the international composition of ownership of the ￿rm,
private ￿rms should be owned domestically to a larger extent than
public ￿rms, and the share of international ownership in domestic ￿rms
should be larger if the domestic ownership is more dispersed.
￿ We considered Cournot competition in which a country￿s strategic trade
policy bene￿ts the ￿rms that are located in this country. This reverses
with Bertrand competition, and, therefore, the predictions this paper
makes on the home bias in international portfolio composition hold for
t h ec a s eo fC o u r n o tm a r k e t s .
￿ Considering the general equilibrium aspects of strategic trade policy,
strategic trade policy focusses on markets with much market power.
Hence, the home bias in international portfolio composition should be
particularly strong in ￿rms with few Cournot competitors.
￿ Improved international arrangements to detect and ban strategic trade
policy also remove the indigenization incentives that may be caused by
4Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) survey and disqualify some of the competing explaina-
tions, such as high transaction cost of trading foreign securities, exchange rate risks, spe-
ci￿c risk correlations between non-traded and traded assets, and contribute an adverse
selection explanation, according to which foreigners￿ lack of knowledge can result also in a
less eﬃcient use of real resources. Their explanation and the explanation given here are,
of course, not mutually exclusive.
8strategic trade policy. Accordingly, trade liberalization should go along
with a reduction in the home bias in international ￿rm ownership.
4 Appendix
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Substituting back into the ￿rst-order condition (7) we get
si =
n − 1 − 2εn
2εn3 − 2εn2 + n2 +1
and
S = n
2εn2 + n − 4εn − 1 − 2ε
2εn3 − 2εn2 + n2 +1
.
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